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  As a first effort at modeling nonalcoholic beverage demand in a systemwide framework that 
includes bottled water, this article examines the impact of advertising on the demand for 
nonalcoholic beverages in the United States. We employed an AIDS (almost ideal demand 
system) model of five jointly estimated equations that included advertising expenditures as 
explanatory variables to evaluate annual U.S. consumption of nonalcoholic beverages for 1974 
through 2005. Results suggest that advertising increases demand for fluid milk, soft drinks, 
and coffee and tea, but not for juice or bottled water. Advertising spillover effects occur in 
over 50 percent of the cases considered, and such effects can be substantial, particularly for 
advertising of soft drinks, and coffee and tea. We find that a large increase in the retail price of 
fluid milk, an increasing trend towards dining out, and positive spillover effects from soft-
drink advertising made significant contributions to bottled water’s success in recent years. 
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This research investigates the impact of advertis-
ing on nonalcoholic beverage demand in an inte-
grated framework with a focus on impacts from 
cross-commodity advertising, commonly known 
as spillover effects. To achieve this objective, we 
jointly estimated five demand equations in a sys-
tem that included advertising expenditures as ex-
planatory variables to evaluate annual U.S. con-
sumption of nonalcoholic beverages—fluid milk, 
juice, soft drinks, bottled water, and coffee and 
tea—for 1974 through 2005. Empirical estimates 
of own- and cross-beverage advertising elastici-
ties are obtained, as are compensated price elastici-
ties, uncompensated own-price elasticities, and 
expenditure elasticities. 
  Although the nonalcoholic beverage industry 
spends an average of $2 billion per year (as of 
2005) on advertising—making these beverages 
one of the most heavily advertised commodities 
in the United States—little research has investi-
gated the spillover effects of that advertising 
within an integrated framework. Spillover refers 
to the cross-commodity impacts of advertising. 
For example, if an increase in milk advertising 
increases milk demand and at the same time de-
creases bottled-water demand, the decrease in 
bottled-water demand lowers the price of bottled 
water, which tends to erode the demand for milk 
due to second-round or “feedback” effects (Kin-
nucan and Zheng 2005, p. 276). Therefore, failing 
to take these spillover effects into account tends 
to generate results that overstate returns from 
advertising and only partially measures the adver-
tising impact. Estimating returns to advertising 
with control of spillover effects is especially im-
portant for commodities such as milk and juice 
that have been the targets of significant levels of 
generic advertising. An accurate estimate of the 
return on advertising of these commodities is cru-
cial in determining optimal spending levels for 
such programs. 
  Despite bottled water’s significant stature and 
its unparalleled and continuing growth, advertis-
ing’s impact on its demand has not received the 
same degree of attention as for other nonalcoholic 
beverages. Per capita consumption in the United 
States of nonalcoholic beverages in recent years 
has been characterized by a decline for milk and 
coffee, a steady rise for soft drinks, and dramatic 
growth for bottled water. For example, per capita 
bottled-water consumption increased from 11.6 
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gallons in 1995 to 25.4 gallons in 2005, topping 
consumption of milk and coffee (21.0 and 24.2 
gallons, respectively). Meanwhile, expenditures 
on bottled-water advertising increased twenty-
fold, from $7.8 million to $158.9 million. So far, 
bottled water’s success has been seen as “driven 
primarily by heightened consumer demand for 
healthier beverage alternatives and greater con-
venience” (Beverage Marketing Corporation 2006, 
p. 47). The question of whether the substantial 
increase in advertising of bottled water has con-
tributed to its success remains unanswered. 
  Spillover effects are properly evaluated in mul-
ti-equation demand systems such as the Rotter-
dam model and almost ideal demand systems 
(AIDS) rather than with single-equation demand 
models. For example, from a single equation for 
milk demand we can learn whether juice adver-
tising affects milk demand but not whether milk 
advertising affects juice demand unless we spec-
ify an additional demand equation for juice. 
  For alcoholic beverages, it is common practice 
to model demand for beer, wine, and spirits in a 
system that scrutinizes the own- and cross-bev-
erage impacts of advertising on demand [see Duf-
fy (1995) for the United Kingdom, and Nelson 
and Moran (1995) for the United States]. The ef-
fects of advertising on demand for nonalcoholic 
beverages, however, have been estimated mostly 
using single-equation demand models [see Kaiser 
(1997) for milk, Schmit and Kaiser (2004) for 
milk, Lee and Brown (1992) for juice, and Nel-
son, Siegfried, and Howell (1992) for coffee], in 
a demand system for a subgroup of beverages 
[see Gao and Lee (1995) for three different juices], 
or in a demand system that also included alco-
holic beverages [see Lariviere, Larue, and Chal-
fant (2000) for soft drinks].
1 Virtually no studies 
exist on the effects of advertising on demand for 
tea or bottled water alone. 
  Only two studies (Kinnucan et al. 2001, Yen et 
al. 2004) are available in the literature that model 
nonalcoholic beverage demand using a system-
wide approach. Both studied the U.S. market and 
excluded bottled water. Using a two-stage Rotter-
dam model, Kinnucan et al. (2001) found that ad-
vertising redistributed demand within the non-
alcoholic beverage group rather than effectively 
                                                                                    
1 Nelson, Siegfried, and Howell’s (1992) coffee study endo-
genized the brand’s advertising behavior. 
enlarging demand for nonalcoholic beverages. 
Specifically, they found that coffee and tea were 
most affected by advertising of other beverages 
and that milk was least affected. Juice advertising 
exerted the largest influence within the nonalco-
holic beverage group. Only juice had a positive 
and statistically significant own-advertising elas-
ticity. Yen et al. (2004) incorporated prices, in-
comes, and demographic variables—including 
nutrition information, dietary beliefs, race, and 
age—to estimate household beverage consump-
tion in a translog demand system. Advertising, 
however, was not included. Note that the data 
used by Kinnucan et al. (2001) were for 1970 
through 1994. The present study incorporates bot-
tled water and employs more recent data. This 
paper endeavors to fill the current void in studies 
addressing the effectiveness of bottled-water ad-
vertising and of advertising spillover effects with-
in the contemporary nonalcoholic beverage indus-




The AIDS model developed by Deaton and Muel-
bauer (1980) was selected because it has many 
desirable properties, including the ability to pro-
vide an arbitrary first-order approximation for 
any demand system and exactly satisfy the axi-
oms of choice, and the simplicity of its estima-
tion. 
  We posited the following linear approximation 
version of the AIDS model (LA/AIDS model) to 
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where i (=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) indexes the five beverage 
categories in the nonalcoholic group in order as 
fluid milk, juice, soft drinks, bottled water, and 
coffee/tea; t indexes year; pjt, qjt, and Ajt are nomi-
nal price, per capita consumption, and real adver-
tising expenditures for item j in year t;  Yt =   
5
1 i it it pq = ∑  is the nominal group expenditure; wit is 
the (conditional) budget share of item i in year t 
where  / it it it t wp q Y = ; Pt denotes Stone’s geome-
tric price index (
5
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the proportion of the U.S. population less than 
five years of age in year t; Fafht is food-away-
from-home expenditures as a proportion of food 
expenditures in year t; ai through fi are the pa-
rameters to be estimated; and εit is the error term 
for item i in year t. The system we estimated is 
conditional on U.S. expenditures on nonalcoholic 
beverages as a group with the implicit assumption 
that nonalcoholic beverages are a weakly separa-
ble group. 
  The inclusion of Age5t and Fafht is to account 
for the impacts of demographics on nonalcoholic 
beverage demand. Previous research showed that 
the proportion of population under age five or six 
was a significant factor in explaining milk con-
sumption (e.g., Kinnucan et al. 2001, Schmit and 
Kaiser 2004, Kaiser 2006). Following Kinnucan 
et al. (2001), we also included Age5t in the other 
four equations to maintain the singularity of the 
demand system. The use of Fafht captures the im-
pact of eating habits on nonalcoholic beverage 
consumption. The proportion of food-away-from-
home expenditures increased from one-third to 
one-half almost monotonically during the period 
1974–2005. The use of Fafht in the model, there-
fore, informs us how the increasing trend of din-
ing out affected consumers’ choice regarding non-
alcoholic beverages. Our expectation is that more 
dining-out increased demand for soft drinks and 
decreased demand for milk. Furthermore, since 
the correlation between Fafht and a linear time 
trend (0.97) is almost perfect, we don’t need to 
specify an additional trend term for the model. As 
a result, the coefficient estimate of Fafht may also 
capture other factors that are closely correlated 
with the time trend, e.g., consumer preference for 
healthier beverages. Therefore, the coefficient 
estimate of Fafht should be interpreted with the 




The model was estimated using annual time-
series data for the United States for 1974 through 
2005. Less aggregated data such as state-level 
panel data or quarterly data were not available.
2 
The price and quantity data were obtained from 
two government sources: the CPI Detailed Report 
                                                                                    
2 Quarterly data were available for price, advertising, Age5, 
and Fafh, but were not available for consumption. 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (the 
price of bottled water was obtained from Bever-
age Marketing Corporation) and the Food Avail-
ability (Per Capita) Data System from the Eco-
nomic Research Service (ERS) at the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture. Soft drinks and juice re-
fer specifically to carbonated soft drinks and fruit 
juice. Data on Age5 and Fafh were obtained from 
ERS as well. The advertising data were obtained 
from private sources, chiefly Ad $ Summary pub-
lished by Leading National Advertisers, Inc., and 
AdView, an advertising tracking program main-
tained by AC Nielsen. Milk advertising in this 
case was strictly generic advertising. Juice adver-
tising combined generic and brand advertising. 
Advertising for the other three beverage catego-
ries was all brand advertising. A media cost index 
(2004 = 100), which was computed from annual 
changes in promotion and advertising costs by 
media and provided by Dairy Management Inc., 
was used to deflate the advertising figures. A 
more complete description of the data, including 
sources, is available in Kinnucan et al. (2001, pp. 
24–28) and Zheng, Kinnucan, and Kaiser (2008). 
Definitions of variables and summary statistics 
for the data are reported in Table 1. 
 
Estimation and Parameter Estimates 
 
The model was estimated using the PROC MODEL 
procedure in SAS 9.1. Given that we estimated a 
conditional demand system using time-series data, 
the potential presence of group-expenditure (“ex-
penditure” for short) endogeneity and serial auto-
correlation is necessarily examined (see LaFrance 
1991, Thompson 2004). The endogeneity of ex-
penditure was examined using ln(Inct/Pt) and a 
linear trend variable as instruments for ln(Yt/Pt)  
where Inc is per capita personal income obtained 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Our 
testing procedure is similar to that used by 
McGuirk et al. (1995, p. 17). The Wald statistic 
for the null hypothesis that the expenditure is ex-
ogenous was not statistically significant at the 5 
percent level (default level in this paper). 
  The Godfrey’s serial autocorrelation test indi-
cated the existence of autocorrelation; we there-
fore estimated the LA/AIDS model with an AR 
(1) process: 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics, 1974–2005 
Variable Definition  Mean Minimum  Maximum  s.d. 
q1  Per capita fluid milk consumption,  gallons/person  25.35 20.98 29.50 2.54 
q2  Per capita juice consumption, gallons/person  7.91  6.15  9.10  0.84 
q3  Per capita soft-drink consumption,  gallons/person  43.98 27.60 53.80 8.41 
q4  Per capita bottled-water consumption, gallons/person  9.41 1.26  25.43  6.99 
q5  Per capita coffee/tea consumption,  gallons/person  33.37 28.16 40.62 2.72 
p1  Nominal retail price for fluid milk, $/gallon  2.16  1.23  3.34  0.61 
p2  Nominal retail price for juice, $/gallon  3.67  1.50  5.26  1.16 
p3  Nominal retail price for soft drinks,  $/gallon  1.66 0.83 2.11  0.35 
p4  Nominal retail price for bottled water, $/gallon  1.06 0.70 1.36  0.19 
p5  Nominal retail price for coffee/tea, $/gallon  0.84  0.33  1.12  0.20 
A1  Advertising expenditures for fluid milk, million $ in 2004 $  56.06  9.77  160.57  42.81 
A2  Advertising expenditures for juice, million $ in 2004 $  244.12 31.33  730.42  148.34 
A3  Advertising expenditures for soft drinks, million $ in 2004 $ 422.78  97.00  807.77 197.77 
A4  Advertising expenditures for bottled water, million $ in 2004 $  34.04  6.97  158.92 39.11 
A5  Advertising expenditures for coffee/tea, million $ in 2004 $ 215.71  73.86  340.45 61.49 
w1  Budget share for fluid milk, conditional 0.28  0.23 0.44  0.05 
w2  Budget share for juice, conditional 0.15  0.11 0.17  0.02 
w3  Budget share for soft drinks, conditional  0.37 0.28 0.42  0.04 
w4  Budget share for bottled water, conditional  0.05 0.01 0.12  0.03 
w5  Budget share for coffee/tea, conditional 0.15  0.11 0.23  0.03 
Fafh (%)  Food-away-from-home expenditures / total food expenditures   43.45  34.10  48.49  4.16 
Age5 (%)  Proportion of the U.S. population younger than age five  7.25  6.78  7.71  0.29 
 
where  ρi1 is the first-order autoregressive para-
meters and uit is a white-noise disturbance. Fi-
nally, a White’s test for heteroscedasticity was 




1 1 i i w = = ∑ , the following adding-up 
conditions are met automatically, implying that 







11 0   and    1.












The juice equation was dropped in the estimation 
and its parameters were calculated using the ad-
ding-up restrictions. In the presence of autocor-
relation, the iterative, seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (ITSUR) is not maximum likelihood (Seale, 
Marchant, and Basso 2003) and, therefore, the full-
information maximum-likelihood method (FIML) 
was used to fit the model. Furthermore, given 
limited degrees of freedom in the data, the model 
was estimated under the assumption that the 
equations share a common auto-regressive para-
meter. The model satisfies the multivariate nor-
mality assumption as indicated by the Henze-
Zirkler T statistic. 
  The AR (1) LA/AIDS model was estimated 
with price homogeneity and symmetry imposed 
as maintained hypotheses. The FIML parameter 
estimates are reported in Table 2. The results 
were satisfactory in that the adjusted R
2’s ranged 
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milk equations, all of the own-price coefficients 
and seven of the ten cross-price coefficients were 
statistically significant, and fourteen of the twenty-
five advertising coefficients were significant. The 
variable Age5, which is the proportion of the 
population under age five, was found to be posi-
tively related to milk and soft-drink consumption 
but negatively related to juice consumption. The 
variable Fafh was found to be statistically signi-
ficant for all beverages except juice, with signs 
indicating that more dining out leads to increased 
consumption of soft drinks and bottled water at 





Based on the information in Table 2, we compu-
ted the expenditure, own-price, cross-price, and 
advertising elasticities from formulas derived in 
the literature as follows: 
 
(4)  1/ ii i Eb w =+  
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ii ii i i Ec w b =− + −  
     (uncompensated own-price elasticity) 
 
(6)  / ij ij i dw α=   
   (advertising  elasticity). 
 
All were conditional elasticities in that they were 
computed under exogenous group expenditures. 
The compensated elasticities measure pure substi-
tution effects, and obtaining their standard errors, 
which involves only one parameter estimate, in-
volves less complicated computation than the un-
compensated ones. Calculated elasticities are given 
in Table 3. These elasticities were calculated based 
on the (conditional) budget share for nonalcoholic 
beverages in 2005. Because 
U
ii E  involves two pa-
                                                                                    
3 The first-order autoregressive parameter was estimated to 
be -0.229 (statistically significant). 
rameters, its standard errors were derived using 
the Delta method. 
 
Conditional Expenditure and Price Elasticities 
 
All of the own-price elasticities (compensated and 
uncompensated) were negative and less than one 
(inelastic). The beverages that had the highest and 
lowest compensated price elasticities were bottled 
water at -0.498 and coffee/tea at -0.083. The un-
compensated own-price elasticities are larger than 
the compensated ones in absolute values because 
they include the income effects of price changes. 
For the expenditure elasticities, a 1 percent in-
crease in nonalcoholic beverage expenditures in-
creased demand for milk by 0.614 percent and 
coffee/tea by 3.144 percent when all other de-
mand factors were held constant. Our results do 
not imply that coffee/tea is a luxury good since 
the (conditional) expenditures elasticities are not 
equivalent to the unconditional income elastic-
ities. 
  The (compensated) cross-price elasticities, 
C
ij E , 
measure the percentage change in demand for 
beverage  i with respect to a one percent price 
change in beverage j while holding utility level, 
other prices, and other demand factors (i.e., ad-
vertising,  Age5,  Fafh) constant. These compen-
sated cross-price elasticities were positive for 
(net) substitutes and negative for (net) comple-
ments. Table 3 shows that compared with the 
own-price elasticities, the cross-price elasticities 
were not tiny and that in some rare cases they 
exceeded the own-price elasticities. For example, 
the own-price elasticity for coffee/tea was -0.083 
and the cross-price elasticity of coffee/tea with 
respect to milk was -0.209. One reason for such a 
finding is that milk was found to be price-com-
plement to coffee/tea demand and that milk was 
twice as expensive as coffee/tea (see Table 1). 
For the same percentage increase in coffee/tea 
and milk, coffee/tea consumers might be more 
responsive to the price increase in milk. 
  The top pair of substitutes and complements in 
terms of the absolute value of the cross-price 
elasticities is reported in Table 4. The top pair of 
price substitutes was milk and bottled water. For 
example, a 1 percent increase in the milk price 
increased demand for bottled water by 0.898 per-
cent, while a 1 percent increase in the price of 
bottled water increased demand for milk by 0.433 Zheng and Kaiser  Advertising and U.S. Nonalcoholic Beverage Demand   153 
 
 
Table 3. Elasticities 





QUANTITY OF ...    1
C
i E   2
C
i E      3
C
i E    4
C
i E    5
C
i E   i E   
U
ii E  
Milk  -0.154** -0.097** -0.078** 0.433** -0.105** 0.614**  -0.301** 
Juice  -0.153**  -0.172** 0.549 -0.176**  -0.048** 0.656  -0.272 
Soft  drinks  -0.050** 0.224 -0.151**  -0.095** 0.071  0.997  -0.521** 
Bottled water  0.898**  -0.232**  -0.305** -0.498** 0.137** 0.029  -0.501** 
Coffee/tea  -0.209**  -0.060** 0.220  0.131 -0.083**  3.144**  -0.462** 
  Advertising Elasticities    
cont’d. 
  1 i α   2 i α      3 i α    4 i α   5 i α     
Milk  0.024** 0.049** -0.156** 0.023** 0.115**     
Juice 0.010  -0.013  0.067  -0.075**  -0.098**     
Soft drinks  0.014  -0.053**  0.060**  -0.002  0.000     
Bottled water  -0.034  0.028 0.314** 0.040 -0.253**     
Coffee/tea  -0.071** 0.052 -0.258** 0.018 0.138**     
 
 
Table 4. Rank of Cross-Price and Advertising Elasticities 
   PRICE SUBSTITUTES  PRICE COMPLEMENTS 
Rank  Quantity of  Price of  Elasticities  Quantity of  Price of  Elasticities 
1 Bottled  water  Milk  0.898  Bottled water  Soft drinks  -0.305 
 Milk  Bottled  water  0.433  Soft drinks  Bottled water  -0.095 
           
  ADVERTISING SUBSTITUTES  ADVERTISING COMPLEMENTS 
Rank  Quantity of  Advertising of  Elasticities  Quantity of  Advertising of  Elasticities 
1 Coffee/tea  Soft  drinks  -0.258  Bottled water  Soft drinks  0.314 
2 Bottled  water  Coffee/tea  -0.253 Milk  Coffee/tea  0.115 
3  Milk Soft  drinks  -0.156  Milk Juice  0.049 
 
 
percent (holding other demand factors constant). 
On the other hand, the top pair of price comple-
ments was bottled water and soft drinks. The de-
mand elasticity for bottled water with respect to 
the price of soft drinks was -0.305 and -0.095 
when reversed. While the complementary relation 
between milk and coffee/tea and between milk 
and juice is intuitive, such relation between the 
other four pairs—milk and soft drinks, bottled 
water and soft drinks, bottled water and juice, and 
coffee/tea and juice—is not. The complementary 
relation between fluid milk and juice is consistent 
with the findings of Ward and Dixon (1989) and 
Yen et al. (2004). Ward and Dixon (1989) found 
weak complementarity between orange juice and 
fluid milk, with an estimated elasticity of fluid 
milk consumption with respect to orange-juice 
price being -0.046. Yen et al. (2004) found that 
whole milk is a net complement to juice, while 
reduced-fat milk is not. An example of the com-
plementary nature of milk and juice is that many 
people drink juice with their cereal and milk at 
breakfast. 
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Conditional Advertising Elasticities 
 
For the own-advertising effects, we found that 
advertising had a positive and statistically signifi-
cant impact on demand for milk, soft drinks, and 
coffee/tea. Advertising for juice and bottled water 
did not have a statistically significant own effect. 
Table 3 shows that the own-advertising elastic-
ities were 0.024 for milk, 0.060 for soft drinks, 
and 0.138 for coffee/tea. For example, per capita 
demand and real advertising expenditures for milk 
were 21 gallons and $90 million, respectively, in 
2005. Our finding suggests that a 1 percent in-
crease in real milk advertising would increase per 
capita milk demand by 0.024 percent (holding all 
other demand factors constant). That is, an in-
crease of $0.9 million in real milk advertising in 
2005 would increase per capita demand for milk 
by 0.005 pounds.
4 Our estimated elasticity of 
0.024 and Kinnucan et al.’s (2001) system esti-
mate of 0.003 for milk’s own-advertising elasti-
city are smaller than Kaiser’s (2000, 2006) sin-
gle-equation estimates of 0.051 for 1984–1999 
and 0.056 for 1995–2005. This finding under-
scores the importance of taking spillover effects 
into account when measuring returns to advertis-
ing. In contrast, the own-advertising elasticities 
that Kinnucan et al. (2001) found to be statisti-
cally significant were 0.136 for juice and -0.100 
for soft drinks. Our results suggest that coffee/tea 
advertising was the most successful in enhancing 
demand, followed by advertising of soft drinks 
and milk.
 
  Eleven of the twenty cases demonstrated sta-
tistically significant spillover effects. Table 3 re-
veals that soft-drink and coffee/tea advertising 
exerted the largest influence within the group. For 
example, the demand elasticity of bottled water 
with respect to coffee/tea advertising was -0.253, 
indicating that a 1 percent increase in coffee/tea 
advertising could result in a 0.253 percent de-
crease in demand for bottled water, ceteris pari-
                                                                                    
4 An anonymous reviewer of this journal article suggested 
that it would be interesting to calculate marginal rate of return 
of own advertising. Holding price constant, the marginal rate 
of return of milk advertising can be expressed as  11 1 / pq A ∂ ∂×  
11 1 1 1 Population Population/ pq A =α × . Using the means in Table 1, 
the marginal rates of return of advertising to milk, soft-drink, 
and coffee/tea advertisers were 5.91, 2.61, and 4.52, respec-
tively, which were all greater than one. Note that such returns 
do not take supply response into consideration.  
bus. The top three pairs of advertising substitutes 
and complements, according to whether αij was 
less or greater than zero, are listed and ranked in 
Table 4. From Table 4, we conclude that coffee/ 
tea advertising had a large, negative impact on 
demand for bottled water, as did soft-drink ad-
vertising on demand for coffee/tea and milk. On 
the other hand, soft-drink advertising was found 
to be a complement to demand for bottled water, 
as was coffee/tea and juice advertising to milk 
demand. The preceding advertising substitute and 
complement effects were all larger than the own-
advertising elasticities for milk, and some were 
larger than the own-advertising elasticity for cof-
fee/tea, which was 0.138. One reason that soft-
drink advertising had a positive and large spill-
over effect on bottled-water demand is that a 
number of bottled-water brands belong to soft-
drink companies. For example, the two biggest 
players in the soft-drink market, Coca-Cola Co. 
and Pepsi Co., own a number of major brands of 
water. Coca-Cola owns Dasani and Glaceau. Pep-
si owns Aquafina, Propel, and SoBe. The positive 
spillover happens if advertising its cola enhances 
the image of Pepsi Co. and subsequently enhances 
the demand for other products under the same 
company such as Aquafina water. 
  We multiplied the elasticities obtained from 
Tables 2 and 3 by the percentage changes in the 
corresponding variables for the period 1974–2005 
to demonstrate how changes in prices, adverti-
sing, expenditures, and demographics explained 
the changes in demand for the five beverages. Re-
sults are in Table 5. Take milk as an example. Ac-
tual milk demand decreased by 29 percent during 
this period, as indicated in the last row of Table 5. 
The most important factor that affected milk de-
mand was Fafh (-52 percent), followed by the 
sum of price effects (-47 percent), expenditures 
(22 percent), sum of advertising effects (7 per-
cent), and Age5 (-3 percent).
5 During this period, 
demand for bottled water increased nineteenfold. 
Of that increase, 153 percent was due to a large 
increase in the price of milk, 108 percent was due 
to the increase in the proportion of food expen-
ditures that went to food consumed away from 
home, 16 percent was due to a large decrease in 
                                                                                    
5 The Fafh effect on milk demand was calculated as the prod-
uct of the percentage change in Fafh and the demand elasticity 
of milk with respect to Fafh (42.22% × (-1.234) = -52.09%). 
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advertising expenditures for coffee/tea, and 10 
percent was due to an increase of soft-drink ad-
vertising, according to our model results. Note 
that although bottled-water advertising was not 
found to have any impact on its own demand, the 
decrease in expenditures for coffee/tea adverti-
sing and increase in advertising expenditures for 
soft drinks helped explain bottled water’s success 
since bottled-water demand was found to be 
positively affected by soft-drink advertising and 
negatively affected by coffee/tea advertising. Over-
all, the Fafh effect exerted very large influence on 
the individual beverage demand. Our results af-
firm the existence of spillover effects and high-
light their importance. 
 
Comparison with Rotterdam Estimates and Other 
Studies 
 
We also applied the same data to a Rotterdam 
model, replicating Kinnucan et al.’s (2001) study 
using an updated dataset. Such estimation also 
provides comparable estimates with our AIDS 
estimates, given the usual caveats regarding the 
linear AIDS model (e.g., Alston, Chalfant, and 
Piggott 2001, Moschini 1995, Buse 1994). The 
Rotterdam model shares the same structural form 
as equation (1) and is identical to the individual 
beverage demand specification in Kinnucan et al. 
(2001). In Table 6 we compared our compensated 
and uncompensated own-price, own-advertising, 
and expenditure elasticities with results from the 
Rotterdam model (denoted as “our Rotterdam” 
henceforth) and the two studies in the literature 
that modeled nonalcoholic beverages in a system-
wide framework. 
  The overall implication of Table 6 is that the 
own-price effects (on beverage demand) re-
mained more robust, consistent, and important 
across specifications than did the own-advertising 
effects. Specifically, for compensated elasticities, 
all beverages in the four specifications had nega-
tive and statistically significant own-price elastic-
ities with the exception of bottled water in our 
Rotterdam estimates. The AIDS model yielded a 
compensated own-price elasticity of -0.498 for 
bottled water, while our Rotterdam model had a 
counterpart of 0.044, which was statistically in-
significant. The two Rotterdam estimates of com-
pensated elasticities compared favorably, e.g., 
-0.260 for coffee/tea in our Rotterdam model and 
-0.249 by Kinnucan et al. (2001). The differences 
between the two Rotterdam models are primarily 
due to our inclusion of bottled water and the fact 
that we employed data that covered a longer span 
of time. For milk and soft drinks, the AIDS model 
yielded comparable own-price elasticities with 
those obtained by the two Rotterdam models 
(-0.154 versus -0.102 and -0.169 for milk, -0.151 
versus -0.164 and -0.137 for soft drinks); for 
juice and coffee/tea, the AIDS model tended to 
yield smaller price elasticities in absolute value, 
e.g., -0.172 versus -0.458 and -0.361 for juice. 
For uncompensated elasticities, the only two in-
significant ones were juice in the AIDS model 
(-0.272) and bottled water in our Rotterdam 
model (0.051). The generally larger own-price 
elasticities (absolute values) in Yen et al. (2004) 
can be explained in part by their use of cross-
sectional survey data. The consumption data gen-
erally had much more variation in the cross-sec-
tional dimension than in the time-series dimen-
sion, resulting in larger elasticity estimates for 
studies using the cross-sectional data. All four 
specifications found that soft drinks and coffee/ 
tea were more price-elastic (uncompensated) than 
was milk, and that coffee/tea was the most expen-
diture-elastic beverage within the group. 
  Compared with the price elasticities, Table 6 
shows that the advertising elasticities tended to be 
more sensitive to model specification or sample 
updating. Similar findings were reported by 
Tomek and Kaiser (1999) for milk promotion 
effects, and by Kinnucan et al. (1997) and Couli-
baly and Brorsen (1999) for beef promotion ef-
fects. In our AIDS model, the own-advertising 
effects for milk, soft drinks, and coffee/tea were 
statistically significant. All were positive. While 
all the own-advertising elasticities were positive 
in our Rotterdam model, none of them were sig-
nificant. Such a finding is consistent with Zheng, 
Kinnucan, and Kaiser’s (2008) study, where ad-
vertising was found to have a positive and sig-
nificant elasticity on demand for milk, soft drinks 
and bottled water combined, and coffee/tea in a 
linear AIDS model, but not in a Rotterdam model. 
With shorter and older data applied to a Rotter-
dam model, Kinnucan et al. (2001) found that the 
own-advertising effect for soft drinks was nega-
tive and significant, a seemingly counterintuitive 
result. Kinnucan et al. (2001) also found that 
juice advertising had a large, positive impact on 
demand (an elasticity of 0.136). Yen et al. (2004) 
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variable. Overall, although the AIDS model 
yields the most appealing results—e.g., signifi-
cant own-price elasticity for bottled water, posi-
tive and significant advertising elasticity for milk, 
soft drinks, and coffee/tea, and high R
2’s, etc.—
decision makers should bear in mind the fact that 
advertising effects may not be invariant to speci-
fications when interpreting the econometric esti-




This study is a first effort at modeling nonalco-
holic beverage demand in a systemwide frame-
work that includes bottled water. A five-equation 
AIDS model that includes advertising expendi-
tures as explanatory variables reveals that bottled 
water is the most price-elastic category within the 
market for U.S. nonalcoholic beverages, which 
are all price-inelastic to varying degrees. Adver-
tising positively affects demand for milk, soft 
drinks, and coffee/tea, but not for juice or bottled 
water. Interestingly, we found statistically signifi-
cant cross-product advertising effects in over one-
half of the cases considered. Effects of advertis-
ing substitutes and complements exist and can be 
substantial compared to own-advertising elastic-
ities. Specifically, milk advertising is good for 
milk but bad for coffee/tea; juice advertising is 
good for milk but bad for soft drinks; soft-drink 
advertising is good for soft drinks and bottled 
water but bad for milk and coffee/tea; bottled 
water is good for milk but bad for juice; and cof-
fee/tea advertising is good for coffee/tea and milk 
but bad for juice and bottled water. Overall, soft-
drink and coffee/tea advertising exert the greatest 
influence within the beverage group. 
  Our findings have two implications for milk 
advertising. One is that more milk marketing ef-
forts need to be made for away-from-home con-
sumption. Indeed, dairy farmer marketing asso-
ciations have started to do so recently. We found 
that as consumers consume more food away from 
home they drink less milk, which could be mainly 
due to the limited availability of conveniently 
packaged or flavored milk at restaurants and 
schools. Since 2005, dairy farmers have invested 
about $3 million a year in the “New Look of 
School Milk” program, which promotes serving a 
variety of flavored milk in single-serve plastic 
packages on the school meal line. 
  The second is that generic milk advertising has 
a distributional impact. We found that generic 
milk advertising increased milk demand at the 
expense of coffee/tea. Such a phenomenon was 
termed a “beggar-thy-neighbor” effect by Alston, 
Freebairn, and James (2001). This result raises a 
policy question about whether the government, in 
mandating economic studies of the direct impacts 
of checkoff programs, should also mandate look-
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